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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee notes at the outset that there are four elements of a claim of 
boundary by acquiescence. The parties stipulated that the third and fourth elements 
of boundary by acquiescence were met, on the record, at the beginning of the trial. 
The appellants have not appealed the trial court's order finding that the first 
element was satisfied. All of the appellants' arguments regarding the boundary by 
acquiescence are focused on the second element, namely "mutual acquiescence in 
the line as a boundary." Mutual acquiescence is described as 
Under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, the party 
attempting to establish a particular line as the boundary between 
properties must establish that the parties mutually acquiesced in the 
line as separating the properties. To do so, the party must show that 
both parties recognized and acknowledged a visible line, such as a 
fence or building, as the boimdary of the adjacent parcels.... 
Aultv.Holden. 2002 UT 33 118,44 P.3d 781, 788(emphasis in original). Once 
these elements were established, a boundary by acquiescence was presumed and it 
was the appellants' burden to provide evidence rebutting the acquiescence. 
Appellee disagrees with the characterization of some of the facts set forth in 
Appellants' brief as Appellants have omitted words from quotes, mischaracterized 
testimony as being something other than that which was actually testified, and even 
misstated the actual testimony. The specific instances of mis-characterization will 
be addressed briefly here as well as in the body of Appellee's arguments. 
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Appellants' brief constantly refers to the boundary fence at issue as being a 
fence for a horse corral but does not cite to the record for supporting testimony. 
Appellant Sterling D. Jones testified at trial that he wanted to put up a fence and 
that he did so [T. 190:20-24](citations to the transcript of the trial will be cited as T. 
then the page numbenline number, citation to the Record will be cited as R. plus 
the record page numbers). Sterling Jones further testified that he put up the fence 
while he believed the property at issue belonged to Appellee's predecessor and 
prior to purchasing the property at a tax sale [T. 186:15-187:16, 191:16-192:6, 
207:14-19]. In other words, he believed that this was the boundary line between his 
property and Appellee's predecessor's property. Sterling D. Jones' daughter 
testified that the horses only came in after the fence was put up [T. 253:11-12]. The 
Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order did not find that the fence 
was erected as a horse corral. R. at 435, % 11. 
Appellants' brief further misstates the facts found by the trial court by 
declaring the trial court found that "As a result of this argument, Sterling Jones and 
Charles Argyle agreed that they would check their property descriptions in order to 
ascertain their true property lines." Appellants' Brief at p. 8. What the trial court 
actually found was that "Due to the relocation of the canal, a dispute arose between 
Charles Argyle and defendant Sterling Jones as to the appropriate location of the 
boundary line between the disputed property and defendants' southern boundary. 
Defendant Sterling Jones testified that the parties decided to check the property 
descriptions and then resolve the dispute." R. at 373 (July 25,2003, Memorandum 
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Decision, p. 4, f 12 (emphasis added)). The Court specifically refused to agree with 
this "testimony." See R. at 367-366. 
The appellants' brief also indicates that nobody who supported their cause 
ever stated that the land belonged to appellee or his predecessor. Yet the trial court 
found that "[o]n April 8, 2000, a fire broke out on the Sorensens' property, which 
located east of the disputed property. The fire jumped the river and ignited certain 
portions of the disputed property. At the time of the fire Daniel Poulsen, who is a 
neighbor to the parties, witnessed a conversation between Sterling Argyle, 
defendant's son in law, and a fireman. The fireman asked who owned the disputed 
property. Sterling Argyle replied that plaintiff [Appellee] owned it." R. at 434, f 23. 
Essentially, the Court is pointing out in this finding, that the Appellant's own son in 
law, as late as April 2000, believed the property in question to be the apellee's as 
delineated by the current fence line boundary. 
The appellants have not challenged the trial court's finding that ff[t]he 
testimony of [appellants] and their witnesses was unconvincing and sometimes 
contradictory." R. at 432 (Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order p. 6, ^ 33). Only the finding regarding Sterling Jones' credibility has been 
challenged. 
Although not brought out in the appellants' brief, the trial transcript shows 
that at trial, Sterling D. Jones attempted to coach his wife's testimony by supplying 
answers to her while she was testifying [T. 218:16-24]. This is yet another basis for 
sustaining the trial court's findings regarding Mr. Sterling Jones' credibility. 
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The appellants' brief indicates that the appellants consulted with attorneys 
prior to the initial complaint in this action being filed and that a Notice to Quit was 
prepared based on that consultation. See Appellants' Brief p. 44-45. The trial 
court's findings cited by the appellants make no mention of the Appellants 
consulting with an attorney prior to the initial complaint being filed nor does the 
testimony at trial support such a statement. 
The actual testimony of Sterling Argyle, appellants' son-in-law, was that 
they consulted with an attorney after Appellant was served with the complaint and 
that the Notice to Quit was the result of that consultation [T. 280:12-23]. The 
complaint in this matter was filed on February 28,2001 (R. at 1) and appellants 
were served on March 3,2001 (R. at 5, 8). The Notice to Quit Premises was dated 
March 20,2001. R. at 125, seventeen days after service of the complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
Arguments 1 through 5 of appellants' brief involve the second element of 
boundary by acquiescence, or the mutual acquiescence in a boundary line. 
However, each of these arguments assumes a credibility of appellant Sterling Jones 
testimony, which the trial court specifically refused to adopt. See R. at 433,432 
(Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order ffi[ 29,33), R. at 405 
(Ruling on Defendants' Objections to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order and on Defendants' Objection to Decree Quieting Title p. 5), R. at 418-17 
(Amended Memorandum Decision), and R. at 367-66 (Memorandum Decision). 
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Appellee will first address the issue of Sterling Jones' credibility, raised as 
argument 6 in appellants' brief, as it pertains to all other issues presented by 
Appellants. 
1. The trial court properly found within its discretion that appellant 
Sterling Jones never gave Charles Argyle actual permission to use the 
disputed property and therefore acquiescence arose. 
The issue of credibility of witnesses is clearly committed to the discretion of 
the trial court. See, e.g., Glauser Storage, L.L.C. v. Smedlev, 27 P.3d 565, 569 
(Utah App. 2001)(quoting Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206,1209-10 
(Utah Ct.App.), cert, denied, 939 P.2d 683 (Utah 1997)) ("'Findings of fact will not 
be set aside unless they are against the clear weight of the evidence and clearly 
erroneous[,] with due consideration given to the trial court to judge the credibility 
of witnesses.'"). 
The issue of credibility as it arose in this matter is similar to the credibility 
issue in the case of Homer v. Smith. In the Homer case, the issue was also that of 
boundary by acquiescence or prescriptive easement. The Smiths attempted to rebut 
the arguments that either of these had been established by testifying that they had 
given permission to the other people to use their property. As in the present matter, 
the people to whom the Smiths allegedly gave permission were dead. The Homer 
Court noted that "[The testimony regarding permission] was uncontroverted 
because the Deweys were no longer alive at the time of trial. In its written findings, 
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however, the trial court stated that the Smiths' testimony was "self-serving and not 
believable in view of [the Smiths'] conduct, demeanor and substantive testimony 
during trial;5 Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah App. 1993). In evaluating 
this finding, the court went on to say that 
Clearly, the fact-finder is in the best position to judge the credibility of 
witnesses and is free to disbelieve their testimony, [citations omitted] The trial 
court did just that here, and we give due regard to the court's opportunity to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses, [citation omitted]. Moreover, the record 
reveals that the Smiths' testimony at trial concerning both the Deweys' and 
Homer's use was contradictory and inconsistent. We therefore uphold the trial 
court's finding as to the credibility of the Smiths' testimony. 
Id. 
In this matter, the trial court had ample opportunity to observe the 
witnesses, their demeanor, and their behavior at trial. It is important to note that the 
appellants have not challenged the Court's finding that f,[T]he testimony of 
[appellants] and their witnesses was unconvincing and sometimes contradictory." R. 
at 432 (Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Tf33). The Court 
found the testimony of all of the other appellants and their witnesses to be of no 
value in determining the truth of this matter. 
The trial court observed the testimony of Appellant Sterling Jones (hereafter 
"Appellant" in this section) and compared it with and weighed it against the 
testimony of the other witnesses at trial. Appellant testified to at least two alleged 
conversations where the only other person in the conversation, Charles Argyle, is 
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dead. As with the testimony that permission was given to persons then deceased in 
the Homer case, Appellant's testimony in this case that he gave permission to use 
the land to a deceased individual was "contrived and unconvincing.11 R. at 433; see 
Homer v.Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah App. 1993)(making a similar finding 
regarding testimony that permission was given to deceased persons). 
Appellant's reliance on the testimony of others to bolster his credibility is 
unavailing. As noted above, the trial court not only found Sterling Jones to lack 
credibility but found the testimony of the other appellants, including appellant 
Dorothy Jones, to be unconvincing. R. at 433, f 33; 432, f29. Appellant's testimony 
was contradictory to the testimony of other witnesses for Appellant who were 
excluded during the trial. Dorothy Jones, Appellant's wife, testified that she could 
not remember the specifics of what occurred when her husband allegedly told her 
that he gave permission to Charles Argyle to use the land. During questioning about 
this alleged conversation, Dorothy's answers included the phrase "I don't know" on 
five occasions and "I guess" once. [T. 223:22-225:24]. Even more telling is the fact 
that Appellant went so far as to attempt to coach his wife while she was testifying 
and had to be cautioned by the trial court. [T. 218:16-24,219:2-3]. 
After a full opportunity for hearing and argument on the outstanding issues, 
the trial court made its first Memorandum Decision where it found that Appellant 
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Sterling Jones's testimony was "contrived and unconvincing" and pointed out that 
the testimony was inconsistent with the testimony of other witnesses. R. at 367-66. 
The trial court then revisited its assessment of Sterling Jones1 testimony 
when it ruled on the appellants' objections to the findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and order. In particular, the trial court found that Sterling Jones1 testimony was 
"contrived and unconvincing" on at least one issue and, while making some 
adjustment to the wording of the findings of fact, did not alter its ultimate 
conclusions that the testimony of Sterling Jones, and the other appellants and their 
witnesses, was "unconvincing and sometimes contradictory." R. at 405 (Ruling on 
Defendant's Objection to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order); R. at 
433,432 (Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order). 
The trial court properly found Appellant's testimony to be unconvincing and 
supported its decision with specific findings that are not clearly erroneous. 
Appellants cite as support for reconsideration their claim that the trial court 
overlooked an important fact in that appellants allegedly contacted their attorneys 
prior to being served. Appellants have continued their record of inconsistency and 
contrary conduct as found by the court in this matter, by misstating the evidence in 
their marshalling section and again here. Appellant testified that this 
communication took place after the appellants were served in this matter [R. 
280:12-23] and the Notice to Quit was not dated until 17 days after service of the 
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complaint and summons on the appellants. The trial court properly did not consider 
the alleged contact with the attorneys as evidence of Appellant's truthfulness 
because Appellant only began to take action after being served with the complaint 
that sought to establish the boundary by acquiescence that had existed for over 
forty-three years. Appellant's actions after being served, like his testimony, were 
merely an attempt to bolster his defense against a just claim by Appellee. 
Also contrary to appellants' brief (page 39), Appellant did not testify that he 
thought it was appellee's predecessor's property until 1957. Appellant told a long 
story at trial which began in 1957 and ended with testimony that he discovered the 
true boundary of and purchased the property in question in 1961 [T. 186:1-191:20-
21]. Thus, by his own admission, Appellant did not know the true boundary until 
1961. 
The Homer decision is directly on point. The trial court was in the best 
position to evaluate the testimony and credibility of the witnesses. This trial court, 
like the trial court in Homer, found the Appellant's testimony about a conversation 
with a dead person who could not rebut the testimony to be untrustworthy, 
contrived, and self-serving. As previously noted, Appellants' entire brief is based on 
the credibility of Appellant. If Appellant is found to lack credibility and to be 
untrustworthy, as the trial court properly found, then appellants' other arguments 
must fail. 
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2. The trial court properly found that Charles Argyle did not agree to check 
any actual boundary that he was unaware of and mutual acquiescence arose 
when a fence line was established and the parties treated it as the boundary 
for 43 years. 
The trial court never found that Charles Argyle and Sterling Jones agreed to 
check the plats and ascertain the true boundary; it only found that appellant testified 
that such a conversation occurred. The trial court found that the testimony of 
Sterling Jones was contrived and unconvincing and that there was no permission 
given to Charles Argyle to use the land. R. at 433, f 33; 432, ^ |29. There are no 
additional findings that any contemporaneous or subsequent conversations occurred 
that prevented acquiescence from being established nor is there any finding that the 
parties disagreed on the boundary line. The appellants' entire first argument is 
based on a finding of fact that the trial court never made. This Court should not 
disturb the trial court's findings on credibility. None of the case law cited or 
arguments made in support of appellants' first contention are applicable because the 
factual basis for the argument is non-existent in the findings of the trial court. 
Since the Court found that there was no agreement in 1957 to check where 
the actual boundary was located, acquiescence arose when the fence line was 
established. Appellant Sterling Jones testified that he put up the fence line at a time 
when he believed that the property at issue belonged to Appellee's predecessor 
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prior to 1961 when he discovered the actual boundary. [R. 186:15-187:16, 191:16-
192:6,207:14-19]. 
The parties treated the fence line as the boundary between the properties for 
the next several decades. This acquiescence included the building of additional 
fences by both parties along the original fence line and Sterling Argyle's statement 
to firefighters in April 2000 that the property belonged to plaintiff. Mutual 
acquiescence was established when the fence was built in 1958. 
The Ault case as cited by Appellant, does not apply to the situation in this 
matter. The Ault decision focused on a situation where one party was unwilling to 
accept the boundary line and manifested that disagreement through several 
conversations that the court in that matter found actually occurred. See Ault v. 
Holden. 2002 UT 33,44 P.3d 781. 
Unlike the parties in Ault, and as the findings in this matter show, there was 
neither an agreement nor anything else when the fence was established or thereafter 
to indicate that Appellant did not acquiesce in the boundary. The court held that 
Sterling Jones' knowledge of the true boundary in 1961 did not destroy the 
acquiescence and that there was no credible evidence that Charles Argyle, 
Appellee's predecessor, was ever informed of the true boundary or the purchase of 
the property by Appellant at a tax sale. See R. 417-414 (Amended Memorandum 
Decision of October 30,2003). In fact, the Appellants admit that Sterling Jones 
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never told "Plaintiff or Richard Argyle . . . that Defendants claimed the disputed 
land." R. 442 (Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Rule 52(b) Motion, p. 11). 
The citation from Stratford v. Morgan on page 17 of appellants' brief is from 
the dissenting opinion in the Stratford case. See Stratford v. Morgan. 689 P.2d 360, 
365-66 (Utah 1984)(setting forth Justice Howe's dissenting opinion). 
The case of Hales v. Frakes. 600 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1979), unlike this case, 
rested on specific, credible testimony that established that the fence in Frakes was 
built to serve as a corral and was placed so as not to interfere with an expected road. 
In this matter, the trial court found Sterling Jones testimony not to be credible and 
there was no testimony that the boundary fence was built as a horse corral. 
3. "Mutual acquiescence" was proved and there was no testimony that the 
fence line was erected as a horse corral or anything other than a boundary. 
Once appellee had established the four elements of a boundary by 
acquiescence without an express agreement, a presumption arose that the 
boundary by acquiescence was established. The appellants then had the burden to 
rebut that presumption. See Ringwood v. Bradford, 269 P.2d 1053, 1055-56 
(Utah 1954)(holding that one factor in rebutting the presumption is that the line 
was not intended as a boundary). Thus, the appellants had the burden at trial to 
establish the fact that the fence was established as a horse corral. 
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Sterling Jones testified at trial that he erected the fence at a time when he 
believed the disputed land belonged to appellee's predecessor. [T. 190:20-24, 
186:15-187:16, 191:16-192:6, 207:14-19]. There is nothing in the trial testimony 
or the trial court's actual findings and rulings to indicate that the fence was 
erected in order to corral horses. In fact, the trial court specifically noted in its 
Ruling on Defendants' Objections that Sterling Jones had testified that he put the 
fence up "in a location [Sterling Jones] described as 'where I knew he [Charles 
Argyle] wouldn't complain." R. at 404; see also T. at 192:7-9. 
The evidence presented was that there was uncertainty as to the boundary 
and Appellant Sterling Jones put the fence up where he believed the boundary to 
be. The parties then occupied the land up to the fence on their respective sides for 
over forty years. Since Sterling Jones' self-serving testimony itself, which has 
already been found to be untrustworthy, does not support a finding to rebut 
acquiescence, the cases cited by appellants are inapplicable and this argument 
must necessarily fail. 
4. "Mutual acquiescence" had already been established prior to the 
appellants discovering the true boundary in 1961. 
Acquiescence once established is not destroyed by subsequent knowledge of 
the true boundary. In the case of Nunlev v. Walker, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that "[I]f the parties do not know where the actual boundary line is, even though 
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they could have readily ascertained that fact by a survey, a boundary line by 
acquiescence may be established." Nunlev v. Walker. 369 P.2d 117,122 (1962). 
This analysis focuses on whether there was knowledge of the true boundary at the 
time of acquiescence. It does not permit the consideration of whether a party had 
subsequent knowledge of the true boundary. 
Appellants' entire third point turns on whether there was acquiescence in 
1958. As set forth above, the trial court properly found acquiescence occurred in 
1958 when the fence was erected at a time when there was a dispute as to the 
boundary at issue. Under Nunley, Sterling Jones' did not destroy the acquiescence 
established in 1958 when he ascertained the true boundary in 1961. See id. The 
Nunlev decision would make no sense if subsequent knowledge were permitted to 
negate acquiescence because the Nunlev court specifically held that the ability to 
ascertain the boundary is not relevant. 
In addition, the Ault decision also supports the finding that subsequent 
knowledge by one party did not destroy acquiescence. The Ault court dealt with a 
situation where there were numerous conversations about the disputed boundary, 
including an offer to buy the property from the title owners. The Ault court noted 
that "mere conversations between the parties evidencing either an ongoing dispute 
as to the property line or an unwillingness to accept the line as the boundary refute 
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any allegation that the parties have mutually acquiesced in the line as the property 
demarcation." Ault v. Holden. 2002 UT 33 Tf 21,44 P. 32 781, 789 (Utah 2002). 
In this matter, the appellants admitted that they never told anyone that they 
purchased the land at a tax sale. R. 442 (Defendants' Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Rule 52(b) Motion, p. 11). However, appellants still 
contend that they did give permission to use the land. Why would Sterling Jones 
give permission to Charles Argyle to use land Charles believed was his, and the 
entire community he lived in believed was his, including Appellant's own son in 
law, when by his own admission he never told any one that the land was purchased 
out from under Charles ata tax sale? See R. 434, f 22 (finding that others 
understood the property was owned and occupied by appellee and his predecessors 
in interest). This contradiction in testimony is typical of what the trial court must 
have considered when finding that appellant Sterling Jones' testimony in particular, 
and the testimony of all of the appellants and their witnesses in general, was 
contrived and unconvincing. Since the trial court found there was no conversation 
after the appellants' determined the true boundary, the acquiescence was not 
disturbed. 
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5. The trial court properly granted appellee title to the parcel of land under 
boundary by acquiescence. 
The Appellants' fourth argument is essentially that there was no mutual 
acquiescence and that the court awarded appellee title on the sole basis of 
appellee's belief. This plays as an assertion rather than a legal argument. Of 
course both parties came to trial with a belief that they were right, Appellee came 
away from the trial justified in his belief after a fair appraisal by the trial court of 
the relevant evidence presented. 
Appellants here site Ringwood v. Bradford, 269 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1954), 
which declared that a boundary by acquiescence can be established by an implied 
agreement. The Ringwood court in discussing the case of Brown v. Milliner stated 
"in the absence of evidence that the owners of adjoining property or 
their predecessors ever made an express parol agreement as to the 
location of the boundary between them if they occupied their 
respective premises up to an open boundary line visibly marked by 
monuments, fences or buildings for a long period of time and 
mutually recognized it as the dividing line between them, the law 
will imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located, if it can do 
so consistently with the facts appearing, and will not permit the 
parties nor their grantees to depart from such line." 
Id. at 1055 (emphasis in original). The Court went on to state "the court in such 
cases indulges in the fiction that at some time in the past the adjoining owners were 
in dispute or uncertain as to the location of the true boundary and that they settled 
their differences by agreeing upon the fence or other monument as the dividing line 
between their properties." Id. 
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The present case is consistent with the approach described above. This is not 
a case about the mere belief of a party establishing a new boundary. There was a 
genuine dispute as to the boundary. The trial court specifically found that the fence 
was erected during the time of the dispute while the true boundary was unknown. 
See R. at 435, ^  10-11. Appellee and a host of community members familiar with 
the land and parties, as well as adjacent landowners, believed the fence to be the 
boundary between the properties. See R. at 434, f 22. Only appellant Sterling 
Jones' self-serving, inconsistent and unbelievable testimony said otherwise. 
The court made the only finding that it could consistent with its 
determination that the appellants and their witnesses lacked credibility, i.e. that 
there was acquiescence and a boundary by acquiescence was established between 
the parties. 
6. Appellants' use of the property was not such as to defeat a boundary by 
acquiescence claim. 
In this matter, the parties had acquiesced to a boundary in 1958. The 
appellee and his predecessors believed the land to be theirs. The trial court found 
that appellee and his predecessors made extensive use of the property at issue over 
the last forty plus years, including as a shooting range, pasture, and recreation area, 
filling in a washed out portion of the land in order to "reclaim" that land, and have 
"rented the disputed property to non-parties for pasturing" for a period of at least 
ten years from 1991-2001. R. at 434, Tnf20-21. 
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In the case of Brown v. Milliner, the Supreme Court of Utah held that 
"[t]he fact that a landowner allows other to share with him the use of his land 
does not necessarily signify a disclaimer of ownership." Brown v. Milliner, 232 
P.2d 202, 208 (Utah 1951). The appellants5 occasional maintenance of an artesian 
well on appellee's land is not inconsistent with the trial court's ruling. The 
appellants had an easement that allowed them access to the well. 
Likewise, the appellants' maintenance of the southern fence, the boundary 
fence in question, is activity consistent with the appellee's ownership of the 
property and a boundary by acquiescence. As a property owner on the other side of 
the fence, the appellants would be interested in, and even expected to help in, 
maintaining that fence. These activities do not negate the acquiescence that 
occurred in 1958. 
7. The trial court properly granted appellee his attorney's fees and costs for 
responding to the appellants' motion to amend and should grant appellee his 
fees for defending this appeal. 
The trial court properly awarded the appellee his attorney's fees and costs 
for having to respond to the appellants' motion to amend. The motion to amend 
was the second time since trial that the appellants had raised the exact same issues. 
The Court already denied many of the contentions made in the appellants' motion 
to amend and the appellants had also improperly sought to have the trial court 
review its ruling on a summary judgment motion when it is well established that 
there is no jurisdiction under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for such a review at 
18 
that stage of the litigation. The motion was brought without a basis in law and the 
trial court found that an award of attorney's fees was appropriate. 
Now appellee has been burdened with responding to the same arguments yet 
again, on appeal. Consequently, appellee submits that the appeal brought by 
appellants meets the requirements of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33entitling 
appellee to an award of attorney's fees and costs for having to defend against this 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision should be affirmed in all particulars. The trial court 
properly found that Sterling Jones' testimony was contrived and unconvincing and 
that the testimony of the other appellants and their witnesses was also unconvincing 
and sometimes contradictory. There was acquiescence in the boundary in 1958. The 
appellee proved the existence of the two disputed elements of boundary by 
acquiescence at trial. The trial court properly awarded the appellee his attorney's 
fees and costs for responding to the appellants' motion in the trial court. Appellee 
should be awarded his attorney's fees and costs for having to respond to this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25L day of December 2004. 
Jere B^neer 
Renecr & Associates 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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